Approved For Release PUP/25 E GREST00975A005000390001-3

25X1

14 April 1960

Copy No. C 68

25X1

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 39

NO OHANGE IN CLASS. 50

DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS & C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010

AUTH: HR 10-2

DATE: 6 JUN 1980
REVIEWER:

State Dept. review completed

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79100975A005000390001-3

14 APRIL 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Polish grain crop badly damaged. Considerable increase in grain imports will be required.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Algerian rebels to accept volunteers for fighting in Algeria.


Moroccan King says projected schedule for delivery of US military equipment "completely unacceptable."

South Vietnam--Guerrilla warfare specialists say it will take three years to curb Communist terrorism.

South Korea--President Rhee considering harsh measures to restore order at Masan.

III. THE WEST

Cyprus--Positions of British, Greek and Turkish Cypriots reported closer together.





3

4

6

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 April 1960

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Poland: The 1960 grain crop in Poland has been damaged extensively by prolonged drought and adverse winter weather and almost certainly will be well below last year's average harvest. Imports of grain considerably in excess of the 1,800,000 tons scheduled for import in 1959-60 will he required. The level of meat production is already unsatisfactory, and without substantial imports of grain the regime faces a further decline in public morale.

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Algeria: The rebels' drive to gain belligerent status in their fight against France has led them to ratify the Geneva convention governing the conduct of belligerents and to implement their decision to accept foreign volunteers. To date, however, recruitment efforts have been limited to obtaining skilled technicians rather than large-scale enlistments.

25X1

25X1 Morocco: King Mohamed V has characterized as "completely unacceptable" the projected five-year schedule for deliveries of American military equipment for the Royal Armed Forces. He said that materiel needs are extremely urgent and that counterproposals will be submitted.) 25X1 (Page 3)

25X1

| | Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 05000390001-3 | 25X1 |
|-----|--|-------------|
| ٥¥ | South Vietnam: At least three years of "hard work and active fighting" will be needed to curb Communist terrorism in South Vietnam, according to guerrilla warfare experts who recently arrived from Malaya at President Diem's urgent request. Meanwhile, officials of UN specialized agencies in South Vietnam have suggested to Secretary General Hammarskjold that the UN security system for evacuating personnel be put into effect in | 25X1 |
| | view of the deteriorating situation. [(Page 4) (Map) | 25X1 |
| | South Korea: (President Rhee, angered by the riots at Masan, is considering harsh measures to restore order and may invoke martial law in the city. Rhee says he is ready to "declare war" | 25X1 |
| Ni | on elements in his Liberal party who advocate moderate action | |
| 1 | and who do not believe the party can risk strong action at this time. Demonstrations at Masan are continuing.) (Page 5) | 25X1 |
| | III. THE WEST | % ?? |
| | Cyprus: Informal but intensive activity during the past few days among the British, Greek Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots has brought their positions closer together, and British officials | 25X1 |
| Mo | have expressed cautious optimism. The American consul general in Nicosia believes a compromise is possible on the extent of British military bases if it is part of a package deal which also includes satisfaction of Greek Cypriot demands on other unre- | |
| | solved issues.7 | 25X1 |
| | | 25X1 |
| | IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS | |
| No | A. (No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.) | |
| • . | B. (No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.) | |
| | 14 Apr 60 | 25) |
| | Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000390001-3 | 25X1 |

| | Approv | ved For Release 2 | :003/02/27 : Cl | A-RDP79T00 | 0975400500 | 0390001-3 25X1 | 25X1 |
|----|-----------------|--|--|--|---|---------------------------|------|
| | C. | The following exploitation b could jeopard diate future: | developme y Soviet/Co ize the secu | nts are sus mmunist h crity of the | sceptible on stile act to the US in the | of direct ion which imme- | |
| | | | | | | | 25X1 |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | · | | | | • | |
| 14 | 4 Apr 60 | 0 | | | | iii | 25 |

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Poland Faces Extremely Unfavorable 1960 Grain Production

Polish Vice Minister of Agriculture Stanislaw Gucwa announced on 10 April that about half of the winter grain (wheat and rye) crop--which accounts for approximately 70 percent of Poland's total grain production--was damaged by "the worst weather conditions in living memory." These included a prolonged drought in 1959 and winter frosts and winds. Furthermore, drought is delaying spring planting and hampering development of that fall-seeded grain which survived the winter, with the result that the outlook for grain production in 1960 is extremely unfavorable. Observations of the US agricultural attache in Warsaw, as of 25 March, confirm the poor development of winter grains throughout most of central and northcentral Poland. Reseeding of the damaged area, possibly as much as 7,000,000 acres, within the next month will increase the already heavy springtime burden on agricultural manpower, equipment, and seed supplies.

Imports of grain considerably greater than the 1,800,000 tons scheduled for 1959/60 will thus be necessary in 1960/61 to meet requirements for both human consumption and animal feed. This situation will set back efforts of the Polish regime to reduce the cost of food to the worker and to meet over-all agricultural production goals for 1960. The level of meat production is already unsatisfactory, and without substantial imports of grain the regime faces a further decline in public morale.

25X1

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Algerian Rebels Step Up Efforts to "Internationalize" Algerian War

The Algerian rebels, who held a council of war in Tripoli from 4 to 6 April, have stepped up efforts to internationalize the war and demonstrate their ability to continue the fight. They continue to emphasize military and political activity designed to force France into cease-fire negotiations.

In a move to gain international recognition as a belligerent—and thereby to set the stage for future UN debates concerning Algeria—the rebels on 11 April announced their ratification of the Geneva convention governing the conduct of war. In a further move to undercut France's contention that the rebellion is solely an internal matter, the rebels have begun to implement their decision, made in January, to accept volunteers "with—out distinction as to nationality." In conversation with US officials, rebel spokesmen have indicated that the motivation behind the initiation of a "foreign legion" was primarily political, but that such an organization would also be a source of badly needed military technicians.

Algerian spokesmen have indicated that the rebels have received shipments of new and "heavy" weapons, and shortly plan to step up military operations. Although the Chinese Communists have made token shipments under their offer last year to assist the Algerians, and may send a small group of technicians if asked to do so, there is no evidence to support rumors that Peiping is delivering heavy weapons. In any case, it is doubtful whether the rebels can launch a major offensive. They reportedly plan to send another delegation to Peiping, however, and their disappointment at the West's failure to intervene in their behalf could lead to closer relations with China.

| and their disappointment at the West's failure to inter | |
|---|--|
| their behalf could lead to closer relations with China. | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


23/(1

25X1

Moroccan King Dissatisfied With Delivery Schedule for American Arms King Mohamed V on 11 April characterized as "completely unacceptable" the projected five-year schedule for deliveries of American military equipment to the Royal Armed Forces. The program envisages a total of about \$13,000,000 worth of materiel, principally communications and transportation equipment, of which \$2,800,000 would be delivered the first year. The King said that the needs of his forces are extremely urgent and that the crown prince, as army chief of staff, will submit counterproposals. The director of Morocco's National Security forces. Mohamed Laghzaoui, who in concert with the crown prince has been urging the King to use military components to suppress Moroccan leftists, also objected to having the program spread over five years.7 The American Embassy reported that material shortcomings of the royal forces were already revealed last month when Moroccan forces had to rely on French transport aircraft to move some units quickly from Agadir, where they were engaged in disaster relief, to quell pro-leftist dissidents. Moroccan forces have been equipped almost entirely by France. Dissatisfied both with the quantity and with the obsolescence of French materiel, the Moroccans now seek the most up-to-date equipment available and have indicated they will not respond to a French offer to supply five elite units under training as the nucleus of a highly mobile security force.

25X1

25X1



Commonwealth Guerrilla Warfare Experts Inspect South Vietnamese Security Situation

25X1

South Vietnam faces a minimum of three years of "hard work and active fighting" before Communist terrorism can be curbed, according to a three-man delegation of Commonwealth specialists in guerrilla operations which arrived from Malaya earlier this month at President Diem's urgent request. These experts estimate that some Communists would remain at the end of this period, but that the main strength of the estimated 3,000 guerrillas would have been shattered. This appraisal was made on the basis of discussions with Diem and other Vietnamese officials and air observation of the delta and Cambodian border regions to the south and west of Saigon, where Communist guerrillas have become increasingly aggressive during the past six months.

The visiting experts felt that the overhaul of the government's political and military apparatus necessary to meet the problem effectively would take about a year. Recent Communist attacks have pointed up serious deficiencies in the Vietnamese military's doctrinal and organizational procedures, communications system, and intelligence services. Political dissatisfaction among the populace stemming largely from the overbearing manner of local officials has also been a factor in recent Communist successes. Diem acknowledges that some reforms are called for, but it is questionable how much he will heed advice on any extensive revamping of the highly centralized government.

The relative ease with which additional Communist guerrillas can be infiltrated into South Vietnam across the demarcation line, via the sea or through the virtually unguarded border regions of neighboring Laos and Cambodia, is a major complicating factor in the security situation. Growing international concern over the present deteriorating trend is underscored by consideration being given by United Nations headquarters for establishing a contingency evacuation program for specialized UN personnel on duty in South Vietnam.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000390001-3

Rhee Considering Harsh Measures to Crush Riots

25X1

Rhee's Liberal party is divided between the advocates of a harsh policy and those who feel that the party cannot afford to risk increased estrangement between the regime and the people. The advocates of moderation are not making their recommendations on the basis of moral conviction, but are trying to avoid damaging their personal political futures. Rhee, however, has stated he is prepared to "declare war" on those elements in the party who advocate a moderate policy for dealing with the rioters. He also has issued a public statement calling for the suppression of "all kinds of unlawful activities" and accusing the Communists of instigating the disorders—a favorite red-herring tactic of the regime.

The disorders have continued for the third day, and large crowds continue to roam the streets. However, student elements who were in the vanguard of the rioting appear to have tired and are not as much in evidence. There are indications that the disturbances may spread to the university city of Taegu, where opposition Democrats attempting to lead a demonstration have been isolated in their party headquarters by the police. The American Embassy in Seoul notes that, while the situation may improve, it is still explosive in both Masan and Taegu.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975A005000390001-3

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2700 P27 SECRET-00975A005000390001-3